RESEARCH REPORT · REPORT BROCHURE

The report button, used as a weapon.

Indian users' X analytics put Pakistan in the top three sources of profile visits in every window recorded. A Stanford investigation shows a Pakistan-based network has mass-reported critics before. X has no public answer on how it detects either.

17 of 17
windows with Pakistan in the top three sources of profile visits

51.8%
peak Pakistan share of profile visits, against India's 12.8%

41.0%
Türkiye share in one 7-day window, ahead of India's 29.0%

€120m
EU fine on X, December 2025

Pakistan-linked mass reporting, a Türkiye lead, and the platform's blind spot.

ANALYTICS · STANFORD · X'S OWN RECORDS · EU REGULATOR

SUMMARY

At a glance

THE BOTTOM LINE

Indian users' X analytics put Pakistan in the top three sources of profile visits in every window recorded. A Stanford investigation shows a Pakistan-based network has mass-reported critics before. **X has no public answer on how it detects either.**

WHAT THE RECORD ESTABLISHES

Pakistan is in the top three sources of profile visits in all 17 windows, first in four, peaking at 51.8% against India's 12.8%.

The method is documented. A Pakistan-based network mass-reported critics in 2020, with an automated Chrome extension and claimed successes. [2]

X admits the problem. It acknowledges many invalid or non-genuine reports and publishes no source or coordination data. [13]

A regulator has already fined X. The EU fined it €120 million in December 2025, including for blocking researcher access to public data. [14]

WHAT IS STILL BEING TESTED

The case table. Matching each Indian suspension to a profile-visit surge and a report call within 72 hours of the windows above.

Evasion. Overlapping personas that share targets and content, with material deleted "for security reasons".

Türkiye. It leads one window at 41.0% against India's 29.0% and is the second source to trace.

The location labels. "Account based in Pakistan" is a lead for X to confirm; VPNs can mask it, and X cannot say how often the labels are wrong. [8]

HOW TO READ THE EVIDENCE

On record	Evidence collected for this report: analytics screenshots, platform screens and circulated messages.
Precedent	Documented in earlier public investigations and platform records.
Under investigation	Not yet established. Treated as a lead, not a finding.

Read with care. Analytics figures are platform-reported country shares for each window, taken from X Analytics screenshots collected from Indian account holders. The 78% poll is self-selected. Source [17] is an Indian analyst's allegations.

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SECTION 01

What Indian users' analytics show

Pakistan watches the profile. India supplies the reach.



Platform-reported country shares of profile visits in each analytics window, from X Analytics screenshots collected from Indian account holders.

Pakistan is first in four windows

51.8% in a 7-day window, 46.7% on 8–9 February, 46.5% on 6–7 April, and level with India at 35.9% in another 7-day window.

It is the clear second in nine more

37.5% on 11–12 February and 32.5% on 2–5 May, behind only India, and ahead of the US, UK and UAE in nearly every window.

The biggest dated surges are two-day bursts

46.7% on 8–9 February and 46.5% on 6–7 April, against 12.2% across 24 February to 1 March. Short bursts look like campaign attention, not steady readership.

Pakistan out-bookmarks India. 44.4% of bookmarks against India's 33.3%, while India supplies up to 85.9% of impressions and 90.9% of likes. Saving posts is what people do before quoting, screenshotting or reporting them.

44.4%	33.3%	85.9%	90.9%
Pakistan share of bookmarks	India share of bookmarks	India share of impressions, at most	India share of likes, at most

Bracketed numbers link to the Sources page.

SECTION 01 · CONTINUED

Türkiye is the second source to trace. It leads one window at 41.0%, ahead of India's 29.0%, and is second at 12.6% in the 28-day window.

41.0%	29.0%	12.6%
Türkiye, one 7-day window	India, same window	Türkiye, second in the 28-day window

SECTION 02

This has been done before

Platforms have removed Pakistani and Turkish networks. The method is documented.

April 2019

Facebook removes a Pakistan military–linked network

103 pages, groups and accounts tied to employees of the military's media wing, ISPR. [1]

June 2020

Twitter removes 7,340 Turkish ruling-party accounts

About 37 million tweets from the AK Party youth wing's network, which mainly targeted Turkish audiences. [5] [6]

August 2020

Facebook removes a Pakistan-based mass-reporting network

453 accounts, 103 pages, 78 groups and 107 Instagram accounts. Stanford found members used an "Auto Reporter" Chrome extension to mass-report critics, and some accounts posed as Indians. [2] [3] [4]

May 2025

TRT World, Xinhua and Global Times accounts withheld in India

Over alleged pro-Pakistan content during Operation Sindoor. [10]

November 2025

X's location label exposes foreign-run Indian personas

Accounts styled as Indians showed Pakistan or West Asia as their base. BOOM had already documented the pattern. [7] [8] [9]

December 2025

The EU fines X €120 million

For a deceptive blue check, ad transparency failures and blocking researcher access to public data. [14]

SECTION 03

How the organised reporting works

Evidence collected for this report, on one Pakistan-linked cluster across X, WhatsApp and private messages.

1 **Post** — On record

Central accounts show “Account based in Pakistan” on X’s own screens. One shows “Connected via Pakistan Android App”. VPNs can mask locations, so the labels are a lead for X to confirm.

2 **Coordinate** — On record

A WhatsApp channel circulated “Report With Strike Mode”, listing about ten X post URLs for collective reporting, then announced a private planning session.

3 **Pressure** — On record

Threats to expose personal and family details, partial identifiers, workplace photos with intimidating captions, gendered and caste-based abuse, and threats of fabricated intimate imagery.

4 **Evade** — Under investigation

Overlapping personas share targets and content, and material is deleted “for security reasons”.

78%

of respondents in a poll on @AmrataJoshi’s X account said they have faced cyberstalking from Pakistan. 22% said never. *Respondents were self-selected.*



Bracketed numbers link to the Sources page.

SECTION 04

From profile visit to suspension

Many Indian accounts are being suspended. The case table matches each one to the chain below.

01 Visit

Pakistan ranks top three in every window of profile visits, first in four.

On record

02 Mobilise

Lists of X posts circulate for collective reporting.

On record

03 Report

A Pakistan-based network mass-reported critics in 2020, with an automated extension and claimed successes. [2] X admits receiving many invalid reports today. [13]

Precedent

04 Suspend

Each suspension is matched to a profile-visit surge and a report call within 72 hours of the windows above.

Case table in progress

SECTION 05

Where X failed

Six failures, each on X's own record or a regulator's finding.

01 It found them late

Foreign-run personas surfaced through a location label in November 2025, not through enforcement. [8] [9]

02 It paid for them

Revenue sharing rewarded foreign engagement farming. Elon Musk paused the fix within hours. [15] [16]

03 It cannot vouch for its own signals

Location labels carry VPN caveats, and X is unable to say how often they are wrong. [8]

04 Its AI got the war wrong

Grok mislabelled game footage and old videos in May 2025, and Community Notes were inconsistent. [11] [12]

05 It hides the report data

X admits a high volume of invalid or non-genuine reports and publishes no source or coordination data. [13]

06 It was fined

€120 million under the Digital Services Act, including for blocking researcher access to public data. [14]

SECTION 06

Seven questions X must answer

Seven public questions, drawn from the evidence in this report.

1. Does X investigate coordinated reporting bursts aimed at the same accounts and posts?
2. Can it identify repeat offenders working through linked personas?
3. How many reports are found coordinated or invalid, and what follows?
4. Does it act on threats to expose personal and family data, including those coordinated off-platform?
5. Why do restricted accounts get generic notices with no reasons?
6. What data can independent researchers access to study cross-border coordination?
7. Will X publish regular figures on coordinated reporting, repeat networks, appeals and outcomes?

X has no public answer on how it detects either.

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[17] The Disinfo Lab: The Narrative Game (Indian analysis, allegations) (thedisinfolab.org)

Analytics figures are platform-reported country shares for each window, taken from X Analytics screenshots collected from Indian account holders. Evidence on the Pakistan-linked cluster was collected for this report. Source [17] is an Indian analyst’s allegations.